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Abstract: If we agree that ‘institutions are the kinds of structures that 
matter most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of social life’ 
(Hodgson, 2006, p.2), and we also agree that they largely influence, either 
positively or negatively, even many of the decisions relative to our 
personal lives, then we should conclude that emphasis on quality 
institutions to a people should not be wished away. Drawing on the 
earlier stated, the present work critically responds to the position of 
Hassoun (2014) that making aid conditional on good institutional 
quality is not good for the poor. It may be true that giving aid to the poor 
without consideration of the quality status of their social institutions 
may serve their immediate purposes, but if the poor are not to be 
consigned and confined to the margins of perpetual dependence, then due 
attention should rather be shown to ensure better reforms for their 
institutions, given that quality institutions largely and positively 
influence and sustain, in spite of other considerations, human 
development in the final analysis. 
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Introduction and the problem statement 
 
For Miller (2007, p. 51), anyone surveying the current state of people in the world 
cannot help but be struck by the vast disparity in living standards and life prospects 
between the global rich and the global poor. In other words, one of the fundamental 
facts of contemporary global economic (and political) reality is the existence of the 
rich countries of the global North (hereafter the rich) and the existence of the poor 
countries of the global South (hereafter the poor). This economic inequality has 
spurred many moral and political thinkers, as well as other thinkers, into action. Some 
thinkers, regarded as communitarians, [1] contend (among others) that there are no 
associational ties, or what Miller (1995, p. 50) calls ‘relational facts’ (that reasonably 
ground claims for domestic justice), between the global rich and the global poor, apart 
from the fact that the problem of the poor is not causally connected, at least in the 
direct sense, to the prosperity of the rich. Therefore, any assistance from the rich to the 
poor is a duty of charity (and, thus, morally supererogatory), but not a duty of justice 
(and, thus, not morally obligatory). For instance, Miller (1995, p. 49) notes that ‘the 
idea of nationality is that nations are ethical communities. In acknowledging a 
national identity, I am also acknowledging that I owe special obligations to fellow 
members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings’.  
 
On the contrary, some thinkers, regarded as cosmopolitans, [2] argue extensively that 
the problem of inequality between the rich and the poor should be concretely addressed 
by the former. According to some proponents of cosmopolitanism (for example, Pogge, 
2010), there is a causal nexus between the design of the global institutional order, 
which is largely influenced and controlled by the global rich, and the problem of the 
global poor. Ironically, the consensus among the cosmopolitans does not go beyond 
their general support for the transnational address of the problem of the global poor; 
their considered views, however, substantially divide on how best to address the 
problem. In sum, there are many strands of cosmopolitanism, and arguments advanced 
by their proponents, the details of which the space here does not permit a discussion 
(see, for example, Slaughter, 2010, pp. 184-185). The focus of this work is on a specific 
strand of cosmopolitanism advanced by Hassoun (2014) that international aid to the 
poor should not be conditional on the quality status of their domestic institutions. One 
could call this non-domestic-institutional cosmopolitanism. It is non-domestic-
institutional because the relevance of the quality of domestic institutions is not given 
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much consideration relative to domestic poverty reduction, and it is cosmopolitan 
because transnational assistance is still taken as very important to domestic poverty 
reduction, regardless of the quality status of domestic institutions. But this present 
work takes Hassoun’s position as problematic. It may be true that giving aid to the poor 
without consideration of the quality status of their social institutions may serve their 
immediate purposes. However, if the poor are not to be consigned and confined to the 
margins of perpetual dependence, then due attention should rather be devoted to 
encouraging good reform of their domestic institutions, given that quality institutions 
largely and positively influence, in spite of other considerations, human development 
in the final analysis. To defend the thesis of the work, an attempt will be made to show 
why and how domestic and transnational institutions do matter to the growth and 
poverty reduction of a poor country. Before embarking on the noted exercise, however, 
both development and institution need to be conceptually discussed.    
 
The work is divided into five sections. The introductory section is followed by a second 
section, which focuses on some preliminary conceptual discussions; the third section 
presents Nicole Hassoun’s basic argument; the fourth section articulates a 
constructively critical response to Hassoun’s argument, advancing the significance of 
good quality institutions to growth and poverty reduction, in the process, and also 
offering some prescriptions for ensuring good quality institutions in poor countries; 
and the fifth section summarizes and concludes the discussion.  
    
 
Preliminary conceptual discussion 
 
The concepts of development and institution are fundamental in the present exercise, 
given that the whole discourse revolves around them. Therefore, they deserve some 
preliminary lucid discussion. 
 
Development: For many decades in the past, it was incontestable that development was 
usually construed in disciplinary terms. Thus, we normally have expressions, such as 
economic development (which was the most popular then and still so, to a certain 
degree, because of its material implications), political development, cultural 
development, scientific development, and so on. However, in recent times, scholarly 
discourse has been reinventing our hitherto understanding of development, a 
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reinvention that now focuses less on the economic account and more on the well-being 
of the human person or what one could call an ethically-reformed account of 
development. [3] But it is still conceivable to have an ontological understanding of 
development that will embrace both the economic and the moral accounts, the reason 
being that both are not, strictly, mutually exclusive as this work hopes to show. 
Therefore, one could ontologically state that the concept of development expresses a 
qualitative and quantitative progression from the state of potentiality to the state of 
actuality, experienced by an existential entity, within a given period (time-bound), or 
without a specific time-frame (time-unbound). One should make the conception more 
intelligible. 
 
First, by ‘existential entity’ it is meant a human person or a collectivity of human 
persons. The present understanding of existential entity may even embrace the so-called 
social institutions, given that institutions in the final analysis are a composite of 
individuals who occupy specific positions, perform specific roles, and are bound in the 
performance of the specific roles by some rules, legal or moral.  
 
Second, there must be both qualitative and quantitative changes relative to the life 
experience of the human person or the collectivity of human persons or the institutions 
involved. Contextually, qualitative and quantitative changes mean a marked 
improvement that pervades different aspects of the life of the human person or the 
collectivity of human persons.  
 
Third, the markedly improved life must be such that it is capable of moving the human 
person or the collectivity of human persons from the level of inability (potentiality) to 
the level of ability (actuality). Failing this, there is no truly marked improvement of 
life.  
 
Fourth, the progression from the level of inability or absence to the level of ability or 
presence, relative to the human person or the collectivity of human persons, is either 
time-bound or time-unbound. For example, we usually note the late 18th century as the 
starting point of the industrial revolution in England (that later moved to other 
European countries and, subsequently, to America). This industrial revolution formed 
the basis of further advances, which have continued to manifest in the Western world 
till now. Given the continual devotion to research and development in the Western 
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world, one could reasonably state that their progression from the level of inability (the 
pre-industrial revolution) to the level of ability (the post-industrial, information age) 
is time-unbound. In other words, their progression is time-unbound because they 
continually attempt to address their failings and build upon their strengths. Their 
progression could have been time-bound if they had not moved beyond the industrial 
age. Thus, in this context, development is a state of continual positive becoming. 
  
Fifth, drawing on the ontological account above, one could deduce a moral 
understanding of development as teleology; it is always a commitment towards a 
desirable end, which may be monistic or pluralistic. The commitment towards a 
desirable end as development is monistic if the end is a given value, while it is 
pluralistic if the end is a series of values.  
 
Sixth, some logical reasoning underpins the use as synonyms of the words potentiality, 
inability, and absence, on the one hand, and actuality, ability, and presence, on the 
other hand. In the first set, the words are so used, given that what is in the stage of 
potentiality is what we are unable to fully use and, if this is the case, then the idea of 
absence of what to fully use necessarily comes up. In the second set, the words are so 
used, given that what is in the state of actuality is, by the same token, in the state of 
full being, and what is in the state of full being is what we are able to fully use. 
Moreover, what is in the state of actuality or in the state of full being is what possesses 
the quality of presence. If the logic is applied to the case of the poor, the focus of 
discussion, then we could state that giving aid packages to the poor, or helping them to 
develop their capabilities so as to be self-helping, is roughly tantamount to trying to 
move them from the level of inability (inability to use their inherent capabilities 
because they are latent) to the level of ability (ability to now use their capabilities, 
which  they have been helped to nurture) or trying to move them from the stage of 
absence (what they lack) to the stage of presence (what comes into their possession in 
terms of aid packages). Similarly, aiding the institutions of the poor countries to be 
optimal, in terms of taking full care of their poor citizenry, among others, is also 
roughly tantamount to moving the institutions from the hitherto level of potential 
functionality (expected role that is not yet performed) to the level of actual 
functionality (performance of the expected role) in relation to their poor citizenry.  
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Here, we should note the mutual inclusivity of helping the poor, say, to practically 
realize their potential (capability or morally refined approach to development, which 
is otherwise called human development) and helping to optimize the institutions of the 
poor so as to be able to later help their poor citizenry to practically realize their 
potential (institutional approach to development). If the institutions helped to 
optimize are economic or economic-related, then it is economic development. This sense 
of mutual inclusivity of economic and moral development pervades this work.   
 
Institution: First, it is noteworthy that institution is a concept of multivalent 
understanding. In fact, an institution is a hard thing to pin down (Mohr and 
Friedland, 2008, p. 421). Despite this, Mohr and Friedland note that there is something 
of a collective consensus that institutions represent the more enduring features of social 
life, that they tend to be reproduced, and that they serve to structure and organize 
social action and, hence, are the most important constituent components of society (p. 
421).  But this is rather a description, not a definition of the concept.   
 
For Copp (1999, p. 6), an institution can be conceived as a system of offices or roles. 
According to Miller (2010, p. 27), some accounts of institutions identify institutions 
with relatively simple social forms – especially conventions, social norms, or rules. 
Somewhere else in the same work, Miller (p. 25) states that an institution, that is an 
organisation or system of organisations, consists of an embodied (occupied by human 
persons) structure of differentiated roles. These roles are defined in terms of tasks, an 
agent who performs those tasks (the role occupant), and rules regulating the 
performance of those tasks. [4] For Hodgson (2006, p. 2), we may define institutions as 
systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. [5] 
Judd (1931, p. 1) states that: 
 
The term ‘institution’ has commonly been used in sociology and social 
psychology to refer to certain aggregations of people. Thus, a state or a social 
club or a church is described as an institution…. The people who are connected 
with an institution are, for purposes of scientific analysis, of minor 
importance. Complete analysis of any group of people shows the existence of 
certain fundamental psychological entities, such as language, public opinion, 
and fashion, which hold the group together. It is these basal psychological 
entities which are the true social institutions. They are as real as any objects in 
Badru, Ronald Olufemi (2016), 'Poor countries and development: a critique of Nicole Hassoun 
and a defense of the argument for good institutional quality', The Journal of Philosophical 
Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, IX: 2, 43-70 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics IX: 2 (2016)  49 
the physical world. They have natures which can be studied and can be 
described in terms of the laws of their own unique beings. 
 
Analysing the various understandings of the concept, one should note some specifics. 
Copp’s conception is somewhat abstract; it excludes some important elements, such as 
human agency and rules and regulations. Offices and roles do not exist in vacuo; offices 
need human agency to occupy them and to perform specific roles that go with the 
offices. Moreover, human agency needs some measure of control in the performance of 
the roles. This is where rules and regulations come in. Hodgson’s conception advances a 
bit further than Copp’s by noting that social rules are established and prevalent and 
they direct social interactions (compare with Mohr and Friedland, 2008, p. 421). But 
the facts of human agency, and the regulations for controlling human agency in the 
performance of the ascribed roles, are still missing. Judd’s conception also follows the 
abstract path of Copp’s. It is almost unthinkable to demote human agency, while 
emphasizing psychological entities, such as language, public opinion, and fashion, in 
any account of social institutions, given that the mentioned psychological entities are 
human-specific. Miller’s conception seems to be the best (and, thus, is adopted here), 
given that it embraces the facts of human agency, rules, and regulations as necessary to 
the evolution and functionality of institutions. Moreover, if Hodgson’s view (as well as 
that of Mohr and Friedland's) is combined with Miller’s, then the conclusion is that 
social institutions are essentially teleological. In fact, Miller (2010, p. 1) affirms that 
all social institutions exist to realize various collective ends, indeed, to produce 
collective goods, such as legislation, security, power supply, health facilities, welfare 
services, jobs, and the like. [6]  These collective goods, true to Hodgson, impact 
fundamentally on social interactions.   
  
Furthermore, a distinction exists between ‘formal,’ institutions, or embodied 
organisations or systems of organisations (in the Millerian sense), and ‘informal’ 
institutions, the conventions, rules, and regulations of the embodied organisations or 
systems of organisations that structure social interactions (in the Hodgsonian sense). 
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Nicole Hassoun’s argument 
   
In the work of Nicole Hassoun (2014, pp. 12-27), the major focus of her discussion is 
the so-called New Internationalism (hereafter NI). Her discussion of NI is critical in 
both theoretical and empirical senses.  
 
Theoretical critique: Before engaging in her theoretical critique, Hassoun makes some 
preliminary clarifications. According to Hassoun (p. 12), the idea about NI is just that 
good institutions matter and, to be specific, this is in terms of international 
development. But how actually does traditional thinking connect good institutions 
with international development? In addressing the interrogative, Hassoun (p. 13) starts 
the discussion with the declaration that there is no single definition of international 
development in the literature. Nonetheless, she surmises that whatever else good 
development requires, it requires poverty reduction, apart from the fostering of growth 
(p. 13). Hassoun supports the foregoing by noting that poverty reduction is central to 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS), the first MDG being poverty reduction, 
and that MDGS are basic in this regard, given that they have served to coordinate the 
efforts of many different actors and provide a broadly compelling picture of what good 
development requires (see p. 13).   
 
Moreover, Hassoun notes that there are many different and inconsistent (implicit) 
definitions of ‘institutional quality'. According to her, some definitions focus on 
relatively stable features of countries that persist over time and others focus more on 
the current policy environment (p. 13). But despite these different definitions, many 
countries and institutions still relate development with institutional quality (see p. 14).     
 
Now, on the theoretical critique, Hassoun particularly aims at an argument for the 
conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will promote 
development by reducing poverty. Hassoun (p. 14) states that many countries and 
international institutions, including the World Bank, African Development Bank 
(ADB), the United Kingdom, and Canada, use formulas for distributing aid that take 
into account institutional quality. For Hassoun (p. 15), one could argue that the debate 
about making aid conditional on good institutional quality is purely academic for one 
of two reasons. First, even those international institutions and states that use a metric 
for allocating aid that takes into account institutional quality often fail to actually 
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implement these rules consistently. Here she specifically mentions the International 
Development Association (IDA), a part of the World Bank (WB), which gives more 
aid to small island states and post-conflict countries than they should receive on its 
metric. Second, she also notes that if aid were allocated according to these metrics, 
many international institutions and states giving aid would actually give more aid to 
poorer countries. One could call the first reason of Hassoun’s academic thesis (so to 
speak, for want of a better expression) the inconsistency deficit; the reason being that 
the metric is not consistently applied as officially declared, and call the second, the 
insincerity deficit; the reason being that the agents (institutions and states) are not 
sincere to the avowed metric of distribution of aid. Given that it is the inconsistent 
application of the metric that brings about the issue of insincerity, then the latter is 
implied by the former. But does the former weaken the argument about aid being 
conditional on good institutional quality? One thinks not. There is a difference 
between making a rule, however reasonable, and not following the rule, despite its 
reasonability. It is true this involves a logical inconsistency, but this does not, in any 
way, void the reasonability of the rule. Perhaps the problem is with the inconsistent 
agent, the rule-maker, and not with the rule made.    
 
For Hassoun (p. 16), perhaps, the best theoretical argument for making aid conditional 
on good institutional quality is the moral hazard argument (hereafter MHA). For 
Hassoun, there are many different versions of the moral hazard argument that posit 
that different mechanisms by which giving aid on the basis of poverty alone create 
potentially counter-productive incentives. In a specific version of MHA that supports 
the International Development Association of the World Bank's assistance to poor 
countries, according to Hassoun (p. 17), the main claim is that if we give to countries 
that are poor, simply because they are poor, rulers will keep their countries poor. [7] In 
other words, the claim is that if we give to countries that are poor, simply because they 
are poor, we create an incentive for their rulers to keep their countries poor. But 
Hassoun (p. 17) responds that rewards or incentives may or may not work. In 
conclusion, Hassoun (p. 17) infers from the MHP above that we should not just give to 
poor countries; we should instead give to poor countries that have good policies. 
Hassoun (p. 18) constructs an argument to capture the version of the MHA thus: 
 
P1) If we give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor, we    
create an incentive for their rulers to keep them poor. 
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P2) We should not create an incentive for rulers to keep their countries poor. 
C) We should not give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor.  
 
Responding to this argument, Hassoun (p. 18) contends that P2 is not generally true, 
the reason being that it is not always true that giving to the poor, simply because they 
are poor, will create incentives for their rulers to keep them poor (so as to get more 
aid). Rulers may not act on the incentive aid creates. Moreover, according to her, giving 
to countries with good institutions may not increase growth or spur poverty reduction. 
More generally, according to Hassoun (p. 18), we may be wrong about the efficacy of 
any posited incentive effect. Other incentive effects may be present and counter the 
posited effect or the posited effect may fail to generate action. Here we should carefully 
note, before proceeding further, that Hassoun is making an epistemic assertion; the 
assertion that nobody knows when the posited incentive effect will be efficacious and 
when it will not be so. In other words, she implies that the version of the MHA is 
erected on an epistemic foundation of probability, but not certainty. But to succeed in 
substantially weakening this version of the MHA, one could argue, requires at least 
two things on the part of Hassoun: (i) she should concretely show occasions when the 
posited incentive effect will be efficacious and when it will not be so efficacious and 
(ii) weigh against each other the two categories of occasions and equally show the 
weightier of the two. If the weightier supports this version of the MHA, then it should 
not be dismissed. However, if the weightier supports Hassoun’s position, then this 
version of the MHA should be dismissed. Since Hassoun has not concretely shown this 
in her work, in spite of her avowed commitment to empirical substantiation, then one 
might not be bound to accept her conclusion, that is, dismiss this version of the MHA.  
 
For Hassoun (p. 19), even a revised version of MHA, which asserts that giving aid on 
the basis of poverty alone creates an efficacious incentive for rulers to keep their 
countries poor, is not strong enough in the absence of empirical defense. [8] Moreover, 
according to her, even if it is justified that giving aid to the poor on the basis of poverty 
alone creates an efficacious incentive for the rulers to keep them poor, it does not 
follow that giving to poor countries with good institutions would fare better, given that 
not all causes of growth will reduce poverty by the same amount and that some causes 
of growth may even increase poverty. According to Hassoun, it is possible that giving to 
countries with good institutions would be no better, or even worse, for the poor than 
giving on the basis of poverty alone (see pp. 19-20).      
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Empirical critique: After her theoretical critique of NI, Hassoun also critically 
examines the supposedly empirical support for NI. Taking ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’ 
by Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) as a seminal empirical support for NI, the work, 
according to Hassoun, argues that aid works only in countries with ‘good policies.’ But 
Hassoun argues against this, stating that Burnside and Dollar’s work has been roundly 
criticized for one weakness or another (p. 22). Furthermore, she points out that many 
researchers have had problems in replicating the results of Burnside and Dollar’s study 
and its successors. Hassoun also states that researchers are divided on whether or not 
quality institutions really matter as such, as some works suggest that good institutions 
are not a precondition for aid to work, while some works agree that good institutions 
increase aid’s impact on growth. Still other works affirm that features of countries 
besides their institutional quality, like climate, may explain why aid works in some 
places but not others. Some other works even find that good institutions may hinder 
aid’s effectiveness (see p. 22). Drawing on the foregoing, Hassoun (p. 23) concludes that 
the evidence that making aid to countries conditional on their having good institutions 
will better reduce poverty is not compelling. In short, Hassoun’s core argument is 
simply that both the normative and empirical supports for the insistence on the 
effectiveness of NI in economic growth and poverty reduction in poor countries of the 
world are not strong enough to fully prove the truth of their conclusion.  
 
Before critically responding to Hassoun’s argument in the next section, we should also 
briefly here question the position that good institutions may hinder aid’s effectiveness. 
Perhaps an idea of a good institution that Hassoun refers to, which may hinder aid’s 
effectiveness, is one that vigorously pursues economic policies, such as privatization, 
deregulation, and similar policies. But one could easily dismiss this. The reason is that, 
critically and practically, what such an institution actually does through privatization 
is to implicitly transfer property rights over productive assets from the public sector, 
not to common private hands, but to specific private hands of those who are already 
rich, who would now get hold of the public assets that were hitherto state-controlled. 
Moreover, the deregulation policy is the removal of those rules and procedures, which 
hitherto prevented rich private individuals from competing to get hold of the 
productive assets. Thus, the policy is rather a re-regulation, given that it covertly closes 
the economic field from those who are not already rich and opens it to those who are 
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already rich. Therefore, it is debatable that the institution does truly merit to be called 
‘good.’ 
 
But it is not enough to affirm the implausibility of calling such institutions as good; 
one must specifically show the rationale for the implausibility. The point is that such 
institutions go against some basic principles of economic justice: (i) the principle of 
participation (or input), (ii) the principle of distribution (or out-take), and (iii) the 
principle of limitation (or harmony or balancing). The first states that, among others, 
every human person has a right to engage in the production of social wealth. The 
second states that, among others, every human person has a right to benefit from their 
efforts or contributions to the production of social wealth, the benefit they should not 
be deprived of. The third  attempts to transform unjust institutions, supports, and 
directs the restoration of balance between participation and distribution when either of 
the two principles is violated. It sets limits to monopolistic accumulations of capital 
and other abuses of property (see Kelso and Adler, 1958, pp. 80-82; Kurland, 2004, pp. 
4-5).  
 
Now, drawing on the brief analyses of privatization and deregulation made above, one 
can see that institutions that pursue them in an unmitigated way go against the first 
principle, given that such like institutions practically close the opportunity of many, 
but a few people, to economic participation which the institutions theoretically claim 
is open to all. By going against the first principle in relation to many, but a few people, 
the second principle is also infracted against many people. The second principle of 
economic justice is also violated in the sense that a person who has been systemically 
schemed out of economic participation, in the first instance, would have nothing to 
offer for investment from which to expect any future outtake. Moreover, the third 
principle of economic justice is also infracted by virtue of the violation of the first two 
principles: there is no economic harmony where some people, because of their 
unfortunate social status, are denied of economic participation and, therefore, future 
outtakes from the economy, while some socially fortunate others are not so denied (see 
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A critique of Hassoun’s argument and a defense of the argument 
from good institutional quality 
 
The problem is how can the ‘helpers supply’ help that actually furthers rather 
than overrides or undercuts the goal of the doers helping themselves. This is 
actually a paradox or conundrum; if the helpers are supplying help that 
directly influences the doers, then how can the doers really be ‘helping 
themselves?’ 
                                                                                                 (Ellerman, 2006, p.4) 
 
Development assistance, based on an economics in which history does not exist 
and human psychology that is reduced to the most selfish motivations, has too 
often ignored some essential characteristics on which our own economic system 
depends. These necessary characteristics include institutions such as legal 
systems and generally accepted accounting practices—not to mention the 
educational, health, and social service institutions that support the human 
beings who run the whole show and for whose benefit (theoretically) it is run. 
A well-functioning capitalist (or any other) economic system also requires 
cultural expressions of basic values, such as trust, honesty, and a desire to do a 
good job or to make a meaningful contribution. [9]  
        (Ellerman, 2006, p. viii) 
 
The best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is indirect, and consists in 
such modifications of the conditions of life, of the general level of subsistence, 
as enables them independently to help themselves. 
                                                                         (Dewey and Tufts 1908, p. 390) 
 
We should reiterate here that Hassoun’s argument is situated within the debate of 
whether or not institutional quality should be held as significant in the issue of aid-
giving to the poor countries of the world, and her position is that institutional quality 
does not really matter as such, given that both the theoretical and empirical supports 
advanced for its defence are less compelling. But this present work holds a contrary 
view, noting that institutional quality does matter. As Ellerman (2006) points out in 
the first quotation, one of the central concerns in development ethics, apart from why 
we should help others, is how we should help others. To address the interrogative, 
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Dewey et al. (1908) contend that the best way to help others who need our help is to 
help in such a way that enables them to help themselves thereafter. As a corollary, 
Ellerman (2006) mentions some relevant institutions and values that should be 
considered. Here, the structure of the arguments that follow partially aligns with that 
of Dewey's and Ellerman's, though the essential details of the following arguments 
differ from that of Dewey's and Ellerman's.  
 
Argument for better coordination of relevant activities and allocation of resources  
Complex problems require relevant institutions that will provide rules and allocate 
resources to help address the following significant interrogatives in development 
thinking: (i) who is to do what; (ii) where is it to be done; (iii) how is it to be done, and 
(iv) for whom is it to be done. Any aid efforts or supports that are not clear about these 
fundamental interrogatives will fail to achieve their set goals. It is incontestable that 
the problem of poverty in many low-income countries of the world is of a complex 
nature and of a massive dimension, given that it involves a great number of people who 
fall within different ages, whose needs may be diverse, and who are disparately 
territorialized, even within a given country. For example, if the problem of poverty, 
which some have argued to be one of the basal causes of the phenomenon of Boko 
Haram in the North-East of Nigeria, is to be seriously addressed from the global 
North, it is logistically difficult as well as administratively risky (being a foreign land) 
for the aid-giving (donor) countries to send their representatives to Nigeria to give out 
aid packages individually to the people concerned, considering the number of people 
involved, apart from the fact that they are widely distributed across the North-East of 
Nigeria. The best thing, given its cost-effectiveness, the aid-giving (donor) countries 
could do is to act through the extant institutions in the North-East of Nigeria, such as 
the state governments or the local governments, regarded as meta-institutions (see 
Miller, 2010, p. 23), of the areas concerned. The reason for this is, at least, twofold: (i) 
their less than optimal performance largely brought about the problem of poverty in 
the first instance and (ii) they have a comprehensive understanding of the terrain. But 
if the extant institutions in the North-East of Nigeria are weak (and this is true), to be 
fully committed to this course, due to many reasons such as corruption, lack of 
commitment to effective and quality welfare services, lack of political will, because of 
religions reasons, to decisively stop the almajiris, used by local religious teachers to 
beg, and so on, then there is a case of double jeopardy. Thus, if the aid-giving (donor) 
countries are really serious about helping the poor people in the North-East of Nigeria 
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to be able to later help themselves, then they should rather first emphasize the 
importance of quality institutions to the leaders in the North-East, and the leaders 
should equally rise to address the obvious institutional weakness, given that their less 
than optimal performance largely brought about the problem of poverty in the first 
instance, apart from the fact of better understanding of the terrain on focus. But why 
should there be an insistence on quality institutions to the leaders, before any foreign 
aid supports follow, in the first instance? The logic is that any foreign aid supports to 
the poor people in the North-East are meant to complement the efforts of the domestic 
institutions; the aid supports are not meant to replace them. Now, to argue that the 
people should be helped, nonetheless, because they are poor is to engage in a futile 
exercise ab initio; there would be not much success, given the intricacies involved. This 
clearly emphasizes the fact that the quality of local institutions of the poor is 
significant when addressing their poverty.  
 
(b) Argument concerning less responsibility and responsiveness of the social  
     institutions of the poor 
It could also be reasonably argued that giving aid packages to the poor, regardless of 
the quality status of their local institutions, may further invert the sense of 
responsibility and responsiveness of the social institutions of the poor, if the 
institutions are actually performing below expectations. After all, the aid-giving 
(donor) rich countries are already performing their supposed social roles for them. 
Critically responding to a version of this argument, Hassoun (2014, pp. 16-20) states 
that such a theoretical argument needs generally accepted empirical substantiation. 
However, the problem with Hassoun’s position is that it relies on what is called in logic 
the argument from negative proof, which states that if there is no evidence for the 
existence of X, then the conclusion is that X does not exist. Hassoun contends that 
there is no generally confirmed empirical evidence, which is supportive of ‘the 
conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will promote 
development by reducing poverty.’ Even the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), 
which is supposed to evidence the connection between institutional quality and poverty 
reduction, is given by Hassoun (2014, pp. 21-23) as censoriously critiqued. Therefore, 
Hassoun affirms that ‘the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional 
quality will promote development by reducing poverty’ is not a generally good 
conclusion, given that it lacks generally accepted empirical support. But there is also 
no generally confirmed empirical evidence (at least, there is nothing provided like that 
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in the work) supportive of Hassoun’s thesis that ‘not considering the quality status of 
the institutions of the poor in giving them aid supports may help reduce their poverty.’ 
The point here is that if we need much empirical substantiation for us to believe that 
good quality institutions really matter in poverty reduction, then for the sake of logical 
consistency, it follows that we also need much empirical substantiation for us to believe 
that ‘not considering the quality status of the institutions of the poor in giving them 
aid supports may help reduce their poverty’. Without this empirical support, the 
position is less than compelling. Anyway, the position here is that many normative 
claims require no empirical support for their truth. Examples of these are: the 
holocaust was a moral wrong; the operation of the former apartheid regime in South 
Africa was morally wrong; enslavement of human beings is morally wrong; 
unjustifiable killing is morally wrong; and so on.   
 
(c) Argument regarding a perpetual dependency life 
The argument here is simple. The reasoning is that, apart from the argument of being 
less responsible and responsive to the citizenry of their countries, if their quality is not 
considered in giving their poor citizenry aid supports, domestic institutions of poor 
countries that receive aid supports, without due consideration of their quality status, 
may become overly dependency-inclined. This reasoning is consistent with the 
psychological fact that, in the conscious world, there is no action without motivation. 
If the aid-giving (donor) countries do not insist on the quality status of the domestic 
institutions of the poor before they are given aid supports and, thus, metaphorically are 
not constantly on their toes (no motivation), then the institutions may become lethargic 
to the extent that they come to depend solely on aid supports from the outside, rather 
than being up and doing to be self-independent (no action).   
 
(d)  Argument regarding a epistemic deficit 
The fundamental argument here is that the work of Hassoun (2014) seems to be 
deficient in the knowledge of the largely institutional context of poverty in the 
developing world. We all seem to know that, sometimes, poverty may be individual, in 
which case the person concerned is not hard-working enough; s/he comes from a poor 
parental background; s/he does not cultivate the habit of saving; s/he is not enterprising 
enough, and so on. There is a high probability that such a person described may become 
poor in the future. But, all things considered, we should not be epistemically blind to 
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the institutional context of poverty in the developing world. Hussain (2009, pp. 606-
607) states thus:  
 
If poverty is to be overcome, it is important to understand the processes of 
poverty creation and to identify points of intervention in the process through 
which the poor can be enabled to overcome poverty on a sustainable 
basis…poverty is rooted in the institutional structure of society and state in 
Pakistan. Therefore overcoming poverty will involve inducing changes in both 
the polity and the economy as part of an integrated process of institutional 
change. 
 
Similarly, Pernilla Sjoquist (2001, p.24) affirms that: 
 
…institutions–in particular informal constraints such as conventions, 
traditions and customs- may constitute both an obstacle and an opportunity for 
the pursuit of livelihoods strategies by the poor. Institutions set parameters 
within which people prepare for and respond to changes in their milieu. 
Certain informal institutions or organisation structures may facilitate 
collective actions and, thus, allow individuals to transcend the limitations of 
acting in isolation…they increase the chances of the poor to affect the formal 
institutions governing their lives. On the other hand, institutions may 
encourage conformity and work to maintain the status quo, often continuing 
the agony of the poor.   
 
 Moreover, Weidel (2015, pp. 2-3) states that: 
 
Although it is considered economically efficient to save as much as possible on 
labour costs, I argue… that we are not being efficient on human terms. Instead, 
we are ‘wasting’ human beings by forcing them into poverty and denying them 
the opportunity to labour meaningfully. Workers in poor countries are forced 
into lives where they must suffer crushing poverty, while their only chance for 
escape lies in dehumanizing work, hardly worthy of being called human 
labour…Labour-saving technology has played a critical role in this quest for 
maximal economic efficiency, but although it has resulted in larger profit 
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margins and faster production of goods its implementation has also made the 
lives of many human beings worse. 
 
Drawing on the first two quotations, one cannot but notice that Hussain (2009) and 
Sjoquist (2001) agree with Miller’s (2010) and Hodgson’s (2006) earlier positions that 
institutions are socially teleological, and this enables them to structure social 
interactions, and they may wrongly perform in this wise. And, as Weidel (2015) has 
contended, labour-saving technology that is, obviously, being adopted by the meta-
institutions of poor countries, despite its noted merit, also contributes to poverty 
expansion rather than poverty reduction. The relevant question now is: how can 
poverty that is institutionally-driven be addressed without emphasizing institutional 
reforms or institutional policy adjustments?   
 
(e) Argument concerning the practical significance of the institutional thesis among 
other theses 
The argument here mainly addresses why it is generally a good policy for international 
development to give aid to the poor who have good institutions. The point is that there 
is a sense in which it is right to aver that what Risse (2005, p. 355) calls the 
institutional thesis is somewhat significant among other theses in the determination of 
growth and poverty reduction. By ‘institutional thesis', Risse concludes that growth 
and prosperity depend on the quality of institutions, such as stable property rights, rule 
of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures, to curtail at least the 
worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behaviour, and graft, quality, and independence 
of courts, but also cohesiveness of society, existence of trust, and social cooperation, and 
thus overall quality of civil society. It must be noted that Risse’s account of the 
institutional thesis here could also be taken as domestic institutionalism, given that it 
focuses on the institutions within a specific country. This should be distinguished from 
a transnational account of the institutional thesis, or transnational institutionalism, as 
represented by Pogge (2010), that there is a causal nexus between the design of the 
global institutional order, which is largely influenced and controlled by the global 
rich, and the problem of the global poor. In fact, Birdsall’s  (2004, p. 301) view 
resonates with that of Pogge's (2010) when she notes that the rules of the global 
economy, and their implementation, tend to favour the rich and powerful, reflecting 
the latter’s ability to shape the rules in the first place. She states further that the global 
Badru, Ronald Olufemi (2016), 'Poor countries and development: a critique of Nicole Hassoun 
and a defense of the argument for good institutional quality', The Journal of Philosophical 
Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, IX: 2, 43-70 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics IX: 2 (2016)  61 
trade regime is still far from a level playing field; the international labor market is 
highly restricted, and so on. 
 
A basic implication of Risse’s domestic account is that the institutional thesis may 
sometimes even largely trump other considerations, such as geographic location or the 
climate of a country (climatic thesis), which some rank equally with the institutional 
thesis in importance. It is undeniable that the state of Israel is largely a desert country. 
The Negev desert covers some 16,000 square kilometers, more than half of the country; 
only 20% of the country can be said to be arable. Here, we see a graphically 
unfavourable geographical fact (geographic thesis). Despite this fact, Israel’s 
agriculture is one of the most advanced in the world. The explanation is largely good 
institutional policies; the institutional thesis that trumps the geographic thesis in the 
context.  
 
Similarly, apart from the geographic thesis, there is also a sense in which one can 
affirm that the (domestic) institutional thesis trumps the resources thesis. As will be 
shown below, most African countries are rich in natural resources; yet, they are poor. 
If resources were the only thing that mattered, most citizens of resources-rich African 
countries would be living well above the poverty line. But this is obviously not the case. 
For instance, apart from the causative agent of the long-standing tradition of political 
and economic corruption in the country, the present economic quagmire in Nigeria 
could also be attributed to over-reliance on oil (as the chief revenue base), the price of 
which has now fallen drastically in the global oil market prompting a substantial 
deficit in the implementation of the budget of the country in the current fiscal year 
(2016), with the attendant economic hardship. And the problem of over-reliance on oil 
for years is attributable to the inability of the meta-institution of the country to have 
formulated a clear-cut policy, i.e., diversifying the economy.       
 
In the Oxfam Issue Briefing (2015, pp. 9-10), the first four recommendations for 
poverty reduction are: (i) make governments work for the citizens and tackle extreme 
poverty; (ii) promote women’s economic equality and women’s rights; (iii) pay workers 
a living wage and close the gap with skyrocketing executive rewards; and (iv) share the 
tax burden fairly to level the playing field. These recommendations, undoubtedly, are 
government-connected and the government is the meta-institution in the modern 
society. If these social institutions were not connected to poverty reduction, as such, 
these recommendations would not have been so worded.    
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From all the arguments deployed so far, two claims are deductible. The first is that 
what Hassoun calls NI, or what Risse regards as the institutional thesis, plays a 
substantial role (that may be positive as in the case of Israel, for instance, or negative 
as in the case of Africa that is given below, for example), apart from an external 
dimension, in the quality of life of the citizenry of a developing country. Especially in 
Africa, one can aver that, apart from what Badru (2015) calls the SCN Theory, [10] 
domestic institutions of most African countries have not really lived up to expectations. 
According to Ayittey (2002, p. 1, Footnote 2; Lamb, 1983, p. 20):  
 
Africa has 40 percent of the world’s potential hydroelectric power supply; the 
bulk of the world’s diamond and chromium; 50 percent of the world’s gold; 90 
percent of its cobalt; 50 percent of its phosphates; 40 percent of its platinum; 
7.5 percent of its coal; 8 percent of its known petroleum reserves; 12 percent of 
its natural gas; 3 percent of its iron ore; and millions upon millions of acres of 
untilled farmland…. It also has 64 percent of the world’s manganese; 13 percent 
of its copper, and vast bauxite, nickel and lead resources. It accounts for 70 
percent of cocoa; 60 percent of coffee; 50 percent of palm oil; and 20 percent of 
the total petroleum traded in the world market, excluding the United States 
and Russia.  
   
In spite of the wealth of resources given, according to Ayittey (2002, p. 1; The African 
Observer, 1999, p. 23), four out of 10 Africans live in absolute poverty and recent 
evidence suggests that poverty is on the increase…. If Africa wants to reduce poverty by 
half over the next 15 years, it needs to attain and sustain an annual growth rate of 7% - 
an enormous task. Presently, according to The Economic Development in Africa 
Report (2014, pp. 2-3; ECA, 2013), Africa has experienced a 5.3% output increase in the 
period 2000-2010. But the same Report acknowledges that: 
 
…out of the eight MDGS, the continent is on the track to achieve only three 
goals by the 2015 deadline, namely: achieving universal primary education 
(MDG 2), promoting gender equality and empowering women (MDG 3), and 
combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other diseases (MDG 6). Furthermore, 
the continent is still grappling with the problem of extreme hunger and 
poverty, and unemployment and inequality have increased over the past decade. 
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Various works have shown that a major internal problem of the modern Africa state, 
the problem that has largely brought about the above noted, is substantial institutional 
failure (see, for example, Badru, 2014; Ihonvbere, 2011, pp. 2-3; Animashaun, 2009). 
By ‘institutional failure’ it is meant the failure of the government, which Miller refers 
to as a meta-institution, to make the best use of the wealth of resources to ensure a 
better life for people in Africa. This substantial meta-institutional failure in Africa 
has impacted negatively on other social institutions, such as political institutions, 
economic institutions, legal institutions, cultural institutions, educational institutions, 
financial institutions, and so on. All these show that the problem of poverty in Africa 
cannot be disaggregated from the lack of optimal performance by the meta-institution 
and its negative effects on the optimal performance of other social institutions in the 
modern African state. If this is the case, it follows that external aid supports to the 
poor in Africa should not be pursued in isolation of giving due consideration to the 
issue of institutional quality on the Continent.       
 
The second claim, logically deriving from the first, is that there is a sort of symbiosis 
between economic development and human development in Africa. The reasoning is 
that if economic development is sensibly pursued in terms of considering all the 
relevant facts, human development necessarily follows.  
 
But what prescriptions should guide the domestic institutions of poor countries and 
transnational institutions so as to fundamentally help the growth and poverty 
reduction in poor countries, rather than the poor countries relying so much on foreign 
aid? These prescriptions will be philosophically sub-categorized and discussed.   
 
Moral prescriptions and political-administrative leadership: One of the most 
fundamental prescriptions for growth and poverty reduction in poor countries is laying 
more emphasis on what one could call ‘moral capital’ in the operation of their meta-
institutions (that is, their governance institutions). For Kane (2003, p. 7), ‘capital is 
wealth in action’ and ‘moral capital is moral prestige-whether of an individual, an 
organization or a cause-in useful service’. If specifically individualized, then moral 
capital becomes virtue-ethical, given that it emphasizes the stock of moral values and 
virtues a person should consciously acquire over the years, such as honesty in conduct, 
fellow-feeling (or other regarding behaviour), truth-commitment, and so on. If 
articulated relative to governance as a system of policy-making and policy-
implementation, then it becomes moral-capital-in-governance, emphasizing core 
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values, such as respect for the dignity of the human person, moral legitimacy in the 
attainment and the exercise of political power, true commitment to, or promotion of, 
the spirit of consultation and deliberation in policy-making and implementation, 
showing the value of collectivity of human rationalities, tolerance of reasonable 
opposition, moral commitment to public-feeling in the formulation and 
implementation of public policies, and so on, at the theoretic and practical levels. But 
why should moral-capital-in-governance be a touchstone for prospective or even 
incumbent public officials, be they elected or administrative? According to Preston 
(1994, p. 1),  
 
 …nothing is more dangerous to the well-being of the body politic than a public 
official who is   technically competent or strategically astute but ethically 
illiterate or  unfit.  
 
Here, for Badru (forthcoming), Preston (1994) is focusing on, at least, two basic points:  
(i) it is one thing to be politically and bureaucratically professional, so to speak; it is 
quite another to be morally equipped in being politically and bureaucratically 
professional, the two not being necessarily mutually inclusive; and (ii)  since public 
officials (political and bureaucratic) are to control and dispense public income and 
wealth through other state institutions, the economic base of the state could be in 
jeopardy if the ethically unfit that would misappropriate the funds were to be public 
officials. Moreover, corruption (or moral diminution) of public officials may induce 
morally unjustifiable compromises at the policy-making and policy-implementation 
levels of governance, militating against high level efficiency, due process, and 
professionalism in service delivery to the people in general and the poor specifically in 
society.     
 
Epistemic capital and technical rationality prescriptions: Here, emphasis is strongly 
laid on the development and sustenance of, at least, two interrelated values for better 
governance of the poor countries of the world: (i) epistemic capital and (ii) technical 
rationality. Epistemic capital, contextually understood as a coherent system of 
innovative ideas, is the theoretic knowledge resource/base needed for better approaching 
the niceties of public policy-making on the part of the meta-institutions of the poor 
countries, as well as for generally providing a reliable pedestal and a driver for 
scientific development. Perhaps this applies more to the African region than the Asian 
region of the developing world, given that Asian countries, such as Japan, South 
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Korea, China, and Taiwan, still possess more knowledge resource/base, as instantiated 
in their productive but not merely consumerist economies, than any African country.  
 
Technical rationality helps in achieving functionally effective public policy-
implementation, ensuring that public policies made are properly and creatively 
connected to substantive problems that have been duly identified, thereby 
complementing the public policy-making level in poor countries of the world. The 
development and sustenance of requisite epistemic capital and technical rationality 
should be government-facilitated (through increased budgetary allocations to research 
institutions and centres and recruitment of truly qualified personnel to work in the 
institutions and centres) and privately-facilitated (by rendering financial assistance to 
the government in the process of ensuring increased institutional funding). It is vital 
that research institutions and centres in poor countries engage in context-based 
research, that is, research that focuses on fundamental problems within their 
individual environments (for example, in Nigeria, two context-based basic problems, 
apart from a high level corruption, are the general inability of the country to achieve a 
sustainable infrastructural and human capacity development and to develop a largely 
productive, but not merely consumerist economy, both of which may or may not be 
connected to corruption). Moreover, in the process of public policy-making and public 
policy-implementation, the leadership of the poor states should work closely with the 
context-based research output of the research institutions and centres.      
 
Economic prescriptions at the transnational level: Moreover, to address the problem 
that Pogge (2010) and Birdsall (2004) noted earlier, the skewed transnational economic 
order should be morally reformed to achieve a level-playing ground, which would 
properly cater to the economic interests of the poor developing countries, as it presently 
does to the economic interests of the wealthy developed countries. The wealthy 
developed countries, which are the main players in the transnational economic order, 
have a negative moral duty to refrain from supporting this skewed transnational 
economic order. Similarly, they have a positive moral duty to take steps to reform the 
extant skewed transnational economic order so as to show that they are truly committed 
to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of the economic growth of poor 
developing countries of the world. This, if done, would largely address the externalist 
dimension of the poverty problem in the developing world.        
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Experientially, all these prescriptions have been basic to the growth and subsequent 
development of the West. Thus, if conscientiously followed by poor developing 
countries, morally supported by the West, these prescriptions could substantially help 
them create a generally positive institutional environment for growth and poverty 
reduction.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
  
In this work, an attempt was made to advance a critical response to Hassoun’s critique 
of the institutional thesis. For her, giving aid to the poor should not be made 
conditional on the quality status of their domestic institutions, since there is no 
compelling theoretical and empirical evidence supportive of the conclusion that giving 
aid supports to the poor with quality domestic institutions will better their lot. 
However, this present work advanced some arguments to show that, all things 
considered, insistence on the quality status of domestic institutions of the poor would 
substantially help to reduce poverty, especially in the developing world, where poverty 
is largely institutional-structured. Moreover, quality domestic institutions, on the basis 
of the arguments deployed in this work, could positively address the issue of future 





[1] Communitarianism is committed to the position that the interest of the fellow 
citizens has a larger moral value than that of a foreigner. It expresses that our fellow 
citizens are more morally related and, thus, more morally relevant to us than 
foreigners. In other words, communitarianism is promotive of ethical (moral) 
particularism.     
 
[2] Cosmopolitanism is committed to the position that all human persons ought to be 
accorded equal moral consideration; that they are all morally egalitarian. Thus, 
communitarianism is expressive of ethical (moral) universalism. 
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[3] Perhaps, this new account of development has led to the evolution of the discipline 
of Development Ethics, or a variant, Ethics, Society, and Development, which the 
author designed and still teaches in his present institution of affiliation.     
 
[4] The commas are not in the original.  
 
[5] Italics in the original.  
 
[6] Italics not in the original. 
 
[7] Italics in the original.  
 
[8] Italics in the original. 
 
[9] Italics not in the original.   
 
[10] The SCN Theory: S= Slavery; C= Colonisation; N= Neo-colonialism. The foregoing 
is regarded as a theory because they track and explain in part the problem of the 
modern African state. As noted, their explanation is partial because there is a 
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